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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona.'
The case involved the consolidation of four cases-State v. Miranda,2 People v.
Vignera,3 Westover v. United States,4 and People v. Stewart5-in which the
defendants signed written confessions during police interrogations but were not
informed of their rights not to incriminate themselves and to retain lawyers.6 Each of
the defendants was convicted after the written confession was entered into evidence
at trial.7 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed these convictions,8 .
determining that the confession of an accused that was obtained during custodial
interrogation must be excluded from trial unless sufficient procedural safeguards
were taken to protect the accused's right against self-incrimination. 9 In particular, a
defendant should be apprised "that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
* Gerald J. Ford Research Fellow and Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist
University Dedman School of Law. I thank Michael Mannheimer and the Northern Kentucky
University Law Review for inviting me to participate in this excellent symposium. I also thank the
other panelists: Laura Appleman, Paul Cassell, Mark Godsey, Tonja Jacobi, Kit Kinports, Richard
Leo, Larry Rosenthal, Laurent Sacharoff, Chuck Weisselberg, and George Thomas for sharing their
insights on the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona.
I. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965).
3. People v. Vignera, 207 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1965).
4. Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965).
5. People v. Stewart, 400 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1965).
6. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-99. In the Stewart case, the record was actually silent about
whether the defendant had been apprised of his rights. See id. at 497-99. As the Supreme Court
explained:
Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not
advised of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In a number of
instances, however, the interrogating officers were asked to recount everything
that was said during the interrogations. None indicated that Stewart was ever
advised of his rights.
Id at 497-98. The Court concluded that, on such a silent record, it would "not presume that a
defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-
incrimination has been adequately safeguarded." Id. at 498.
7. See id. at 491-99.
8. See id. (reversing the Arizona Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, reversing the New
York Court of Appeals in Vignera v. New York, reversing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Westover v. United States, and affirming the California Supreme Court's reversal of
conviction in California v. Stewart).
9. See id at 444.
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he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 0
The Miranda opinion is explicitly based on the Fifth Amendment right that one
cannot be compelled to be a witness against oneself in a criminal case." But Miranda
is really rooted in a constellation of constitutional rights that includes not only the right
not to incriminate oneself but also the rights to the assistance of counsel and due
process.1 2 In fact, assistance of counsel is central to Miranda, and, as the Court has
defined the boundaries of Miranda in subsequent cases, its analysis seems to hew quite
closely to its due process coercion analysis that predated Miranda.'3
The Court has interpreted this constellation of constitutional rights in a
number of ways. And much of the Court's reasoning related to these decisions
revolve around at least four constitutional values: truth-finding, adversarial
testing, human dignity, and equality. The Miranda decision highlights the
importance of adversarial testing and dignity. The Court stated that the then-
existing custodial interrogation environment was "destructive of human
dignity"1 4 and that "the privilege against self-incrimination [is the] essential
mainstay of our adversary system."'s "To maintain a 'fair state-individual
balance,"'1 6 the Court explained, and to preserve the privilege against self-
incrimination, certain warnings ought to be given to the defendant undergoing
custodial interrogation.
Despite Miranda's focus on the values of adversarial testing and human dignity,
many modem discussions of confession law focus instead on the value of truth-
finding. The concern is that modern interrogation methods-which still make use of
questionable psychological techniques-do not further this important goal. Indeed,
false confessions are one of the leading causes of wrongful conviction.1' This focus
10. Id. The Court suggested that other procedural safeguards could be taken instead, but these
warnings specifically articulated in the Miranda opinion have become the standard way by which
to protect the right against self-incrimination. See id. (stating that the above-articulated warnings
should be given "unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it").
I1. See id. at 439, 457-58 ("The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds
with one of our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ).
12. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442, 465-66, 469-95 ("[T]he right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system
we delineate today."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defence.").
13. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442, 444-45, 469; George C. Thomas Ill, Separated at Birth but
Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MIcH. L. REv. 1081, 1083
(2001) ("Courts have transformed Miranda from a case about the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self incrimination to one about due process.").
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
15. Id. at 460.
16. Id.
17. See Meghan J. Ryan & John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of Wrongful
Conviction, 68 SMU L. REv. 1073, 1075 (2015); UNIv. OF MICH., The National Registry of
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on truth is important, but it is also important that the truth-finding goal is not
overstated and does not eclipse other important constitutional values like adversarial
testing and human dignity, which take center stage in Miranda.
II. THE EBB AND FLOW OF MIRANDA
Before Miranda was decided in 1966, the admissibility of confessions was
generally governed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.18 Ordinarily, a confession was admissible so long as, under the
totality of the circumstances, it was not coerced-it was voluntarily given.19 For
example, in the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi,20 the Court stated that using
physical force to obtain a confession--such as by severely whipping the
defendant-was coercive and thus violated the Due Process Clause. 21 In 1944, in
Ashcraft. v. Tennessee,22 the Court found that, even if the police did not use
physical force to obtain the confession, but instead used otherwise coercive
methods like depriving the suspect of sleep, there was a Due Process Clause
violation and the confession had to be excluded. 23 In Escobedo v. Illinois24 in
1964, the Court moved a step closer to the Miranda ruling by invoking the Sixth
Amendment's Assistance-of-Counsel provision in the confession context and
holding that, when a defendant asked for his lawyer and the police did not abide
by this request, the suspect's subsequent confession was inadmissible in court.25
Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Dec.
9,2016).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deprive any-
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 304 (1985) ("Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of an accused's in-custody statements was
judged solely by whether they were 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.").
19. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-17 (1963); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at
506-08 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (summarizing the Court's due process jurisprudence in the context
of confessions before Miranda was decided).
20. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
21. See id. at 286 ("It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of
justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the
confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due
process.").
22. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
23. See id. at 154 (stating that the Court cannot, "consistently with Constitutional due process
of law, hold voluntary a confession where" the suspect was continuously interrogated "for thirty-six
hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a 'voluntary' confession").
24. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25. See id. at 490-91 (holding that the accused was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel because the investigation had begun focusing on the defendant as a suspect-the defendant
"ha[d] been taken into police custody, the police [had] carr[ied] out a process of interrogations that
len[t] itself to eliciting incriminating statements," the defendant "ha[d] requested and been denied
an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police ha[d] not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ('In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence."); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966) (citing Escobedo).
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The Court's decision in Miranda was groundbreaking. After Miranda, police
departments across the country were forced to begin warning suspects who were
interrogated while in custody that they had the right to remain silent and the right
to an attorney. 26 There has been significant debate about the full effects of
Miranda, such as whether the decision has impaired police officers' and
prosecutors' abilities to find and convict offenders and whether any such
drawbacks are worth the values espoused in Miranda.27 Regardless, this right to a
Miranda warning has become perhaps the most well-known constitutional
right.28 Most American adults can easily recite the Miranda warnings, probably
because of their constant repetition on police procedural television shows. 29
26. Of course, because Miranda is a rule enforced at the admissibility stage of trial, some
police officers still neglect to mirandize suspects and instead just forgo admission of any resulting
confessions at trial. See Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 YALE L.J.
447, 448 (2002) (observing that "one can find passages in both Miranda and its progeny that appear
to command police compliance with the Miranda rules and conflicting passages that describe those
rules in terms of their effect on admissibility" but stating that "[o]nly the latter passages cohere
with the language of the privilege, immunity doctrine, the penalty cases, the Court's explicit
descriptions of the privilege as a 'trial right,' the steps that the Court took to travel from the
privilege to the Miranda rules, and the lower courts' § 1983 decisions"); Charles D. Weisselberg,
In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (2001) (stating that Supreme
Court decisions that followed in Miranda's wake have led to a "'new vision' of Miranda" that the
seminal case "sets forth a nonconstitutional rule of evidence that need only be followed when
officers seek a statement to introduce in the prosecution's case-in-chief at trial"); see also Custodial
Interrogations, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRoc. 158, 166 (2005) ("The Court has limited the
remedy for a Miranda violation to the exclusion of testimonial evidence obtained in violation of
Miranda."); supra note 10 (noting that the Miranda Court left room for other procedural safeguards
to be taken instead of what has become known as "mirandizing" the defendant).
27. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1060,
1107-32 (arguing that "Miranda has in fact handcuffed the cops and that society should begin to
explore other, less costly ways of regulating police interrogation"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda,
Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV.
941, 943 (2001) ("Miranda probably prevents some confessions, but it also helps the police obtain
others. The great weight of the evidence suggests that the Miranda system, as currently
administered, causes no net reduction in confession rates, clearance rates, or conviction rates.");
George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: "Embedded" in Our
National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 207-08,254-56 (2002) ("[A]s it now exists, the Miranda
rule does not seriously obstruct law enforcement interests. Indeed, in operation Miranda might
further law enforcement interests more than it does the interests of suspects.").
28. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Miranda has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our
national culture."); Clymer, supra note 26, at 449 ("Miranda v. Arizona is the Supreme Court's
best-known criminal justice decision."); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J.
CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 627 (1996) (stating that Miranda is "possibly the most famous court
case in American history"); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 110
(1998) ("Miranda v. Arizona may be the United States Supreme Court's best-known decision.").
But see infra text accompanying notes 50-56 (explaining that there have been real questions about
whether Miranda warnings are actually a constitutional right).
29. See Clymer, supra note 26, at 449 (suggesting that most Americans' understandings of
Miranda are derived from "police television programs, movies, or books"); Richard A. Leo,
Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MicH. L. REV. 1000, 1000
(2001) ("The Miranda warnings themselves have become so well-known through the media of
416 [Vol. 43:3
2016] ADVERSARIAL TESTING AND DIGNITY IN CONFESSIONAL LAW
Even though the Court took a substantial leap forward in Miranda, it tried to
downplay the case's groundbreaking nature. The Court argued that the decision
was "not an innovation in [the Court's] jurisprudence, but [was instead] an
application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings."30
Although this seems like a mischaracterization of the decision, one can
understand why the majority painted the decision as no constitutional innovation:
Many believe that the Court should strive to be consistent in its jurisprudence; it
ought to apply the law and not legislate from the bench. As Chief Justice Roberts
famously explained in his senate confirmation hearings: "Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them."31 The Miranda
decision arguably went far beyond calling balls and strikes, so the Court sought
to deemphasize the revolutionary nature of the decision.32 Characterizing the
television that most people recognize them immediately."); Frederick Schauer, The Miranda
Warning, 88 WASH. L. REv. 155, 155 (2013) ("Largely as a consequence of American television
and movies, Miranda v. Arizona may well be the most famous appellate case in the world.").
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
31. Judge John Roberts, Transcript: Day One of the Roberts Hearings, WASH. POST, Sept 13,
2005,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300693.html.
Roberts elaborated:
Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges
are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them.
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays
by the rules.
But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.
Judges have to have the humility to recognize that they operate within a system
of precedent, shaped by other judges equally striving to live up to the judicial
oath.
And judges have to have the modesty to be open in the decisional process to the
considered views of their colleagues on the bench.
Id. Justice Roberts has been roundly criticized for oversimplifying the role of a judge. See, e.g., The
Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearing Before Comm. on the Judiciary of the US Senate, 11Ith Cong. 202-03 (2010) (statement
of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General of the United States) (suggesting that the umpire metaphor is
oversimplified); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 21 (Princeton Univ. Press 2007) ("Judges cannot apply the [law] in the
way that umpires apply the definition of a strike zone."); Anthony R. Reeves, Do Judges Have an
Obligation to Enforce the Law?: Moral Responsibility and Judicial-Reasoning, 29 LAW & PHIL.
159, 161 (2009) ("The 'umpire model' grossly oversimplifies the nature of responsible judicial
reasoning and distorts the moral position of the judge, particularly in cases where a polity is at risk
of committing a serious moral wrong."); cf Bruce Weber, Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/weekinreview/12weber.html?_rd0 ("It is likely that in
invoking the umpire metaphor, Chief Justice Roberts was consciously oversimplifying his judicial
philosophy.").
32. Of course Justice Roberts's view of the judge as simply calling balls and strikes is an
oversimplification of judges' roles. See supra note 31. Arguably, the Miranda decision could be
categorized as judicial activism, though. See, e.g., John H. Blume et. al., Education and
Interrogation: Comparing Brown and Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 321, 337 (2005) (suggesting
417
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decision as no innovation in the Court's jurisprudence was important to
maintaining the Court's legitimacy.
Despite the effort the Court took to justify the decision, the Court has been
chipping away at Miranda in recent decades. For example, in Berkemer v.
McCarty,3 3 the Court cut back on the custody requirement of Miranda by finding
that a drunk driver was not in custody when he was pulled over and questioned
by a state highway patrol officer. 34 The Court has also suggested that Terry stops
are not custodial and thus Miranda does not apply in those instances.35 The Court
has further narrowed Miranda through the scope of the interrogation
requirement. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 3 6 for example, a plurality of the Court
explained that certain questions-those related to "routine booking information"
like name, address, height, weight, and eye color, which are used for
identification purposes-fall outside of Miranda's scope.37
The Court has continued to narrow Miranda in other ways as well. For
example, in Harris v. New York,38 the Court held that un-mirandized statements
may be used for impeachment purposes: 39 "The shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense . .. ."40 in
New York v. Quarles,41 the Court held that there is a public safety exception to
that Miranda is a "prime example[] of judicial activism"); Edwin Meese II, Challenges Facing
Our System of Justice, 3 AVE MARIA L. REv. 303, 312 (2005) (stating that Miranda "changed
entirely the requirements imposed on states to conform to a federal standard of criminal procedure
that was not at the time required by the Constitution" and referring to this as a result of "judicial
activism").
33. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
34. See id. at 441 ("[W]e find nothing in the record that indicates that respondent should have
been given Miranda warnings at any point prior to the time Trooper Williams placed him under
arrest.. . . [W]e reject the contention that the initial stop of respondent's car, by itself, rendered him
'in custody."').
35. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010) ("[T]he temporary and relatively
nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda
custody."); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (stating that the "nonthreatening character of detentions of
this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in [the Court's] opinions that Terry stops are
subject to the dictates of Miranda"). A "Terry stop," also known as a "stop and frisk," is "[a] police
officer's brief detention, questioning, and search of a person for a concealed weapon when the
officer reasonably suspects that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime." Stop-and-
Frisk, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
36. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
37. See id. at 601 (noting a "'routine booking question' exception which exempts from
Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or
pretrial services').
38. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
39. See id. at 226 ("The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
We hold, therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by use of his earlier
conflicting statements.").
40. Id.
41. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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Miranda:42 When the objective purpose of law enforcement is to obtain
information to safeguard the public rather than to elicit an incriminating
statement from the suspect, Miranda does not apply;43 instead, "a threat to the
public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination."44 In Oregon v. Elstad,45 the
Court determined that the "fruits" of un-mirandized statements are admissible. 46
The Court explained that failure to provide Miranda warnings creates a
presumption of due process compulsion, but, although this presumption is
irrebuttable, mere failure to provide such warnings does not taint certain fruits of
the confession-here a subsequent voluntary statement.47 Otherwise, this would
stretch the fabric of Miranda too far.48 "[T]he primary criterion of admissibility"
in this context, the Court elucidated, "remains the old due process voluntariness
test."49
The limitations on Miranda have become so significant that in 2000, in the
case of Dickerson v. United States,50 there was a real question of whether
Miranda is actually a rule of constitutional import.5 Indeed, the Court has stated
over the years that "[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself," 52 that it
is "prophylactic" in nature,53 that a violation of Miranda does not involve
"actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights,"54 that "errors . . .
42. See id. at 655-56 ("We hold that on these facts there is a 'public safety' exception to the
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into
evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the
individual officers involved.").
43. See id at 657 ("We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a
threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.").
44. Id.
45. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
46. See id. at 307-09 ("[T]he Miranda presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes of the
prosecution's case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as
inherently tainted.").
47. See id.
48. See id. at 308-09.
49. Id. at 307-08 (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
50. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
51. See generally id (examining whether Miranda constitutes "a constitutional decision of
[the] Court"). After Dickerson, the Court continued to cut back on Miranda. See, e.g., Howes v.
Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1188-89 (2012) (suggesting in an opinion reversing a grant of habeas
corpus that the Court's "decisions do not clearly establish that a prisoner is always in custody for
purposes of Miranda whenever a prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and
questioned about conduct outside the prison"); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 768-73 (2003)
(holding that a suspect's confession elicited in violation of Miranda did not provide a basis for a
civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
52. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
53. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
54. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (stating that a Miranda violation is not an "actual infringement of.
constitutional rights" in light of the Court's holding and reasoning in Michigan v. Tucker).
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made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda
procedures ... should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself,"5 5 and that Miranda's "procedural
safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
was protected"-that they "were not intended to 'create a constitutional
straightjacket' . . . but rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right."5 6
Considering all of these statements playing down the importance of Miranda,
the breadth of the landmark decision seems to have narrowed. Indeed, as the
Court has continued sketching the boundaries of Miranda over the years, it has
arguably returned to something closer to a Due Process Clause coercion and
voluntariness analysis.5 7
III. AN ARRAY OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Miranda is ordinarily considered a case premised on the Fifth Amendment
right not to incriminate oneself.5 8 Indeed, the Miranda Court stated that the case
dealt with "the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is
subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself."5 9 Yet Miranda and
its progeny, as well as an array of constitutional criminal procedure cases, rely on
a constellation of constitutional provisions. Miranda, for example, relied not only
on the Self-Incrimination Clause, but it was also built on the Due Process and
Assistance-of-Counsel Clauses. 60 Its analysis was based on an earlier case-
Escobedo v. Illinois6 t-which explicitly relied on both the Self-Incrimination
Clause and the Assistance-of-Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 62 Further,
55. Id. at 308-09.
56. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
57. See generally Thomas, supra note 13, at 1083 (arguing that, "[w]hatever the Miranda
majority contemplated, courts deciding Miranda issues after the Supreme Court's seminal case
were "somewhat hostile" to Miranda and "have transformed Miranda from a case about the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination to one about due process"); see also Susan R.
Klein, Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 568
(2001) (noting Professor Thomas's "key insight" that "Miranda has been effectively transformed . .
. from a case that all but mandated defense attorney participation in custodial interrogations to
dispel inherent compulsion, to a case about providing the minimal amount of notice to a defendant
about his privilege against self-incrimination such that a court can uphold his confession as
voluntary"); supra text accompanying notes 18-25 (summarizing the Court's due process test).
58. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself. . . .").
59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
60. See id. at 442, 469.
61. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
62. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442 (explaining the basis for the Court's holding in Escobedo);
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479, 488 (stating that the "critical question" in the case was whether there
was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and stating that "[o]ur Constitution ...
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the Miranda Court explained that, because "[t]he circumstances surrounding in-
custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely
made aware of his privilege by his interrogators"-a due process concern-"the
right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege." 63 The Court's general concerns
about the police interrogation methods at play in Miranda mirror the Court's
coercion concerns expressed in its due process cases. 64 As the dissenting Justices
in Miranda pointed out, though, the methods were less extreme in Miranda than
in cases in which the Court had previously found due process violations. 65 Still,
the Miranda Court relied on both the Due Process and Assistance-of-Counsel
Clauses in addition to the Self-Incrimination Clause. And the case is not unique
in relying on an array of constitutional provisions. Beyond the constitutional
provisions themselves, though, the Court regularly relies on at least four
important constitutional criminal procedural values. These are the values of
adversarial testing, truth-finding, dignity, and equality.
In many cases, including Miranda, the Court has discussed the importance of
the adversarial system under this constellation of constitutional clauses.
Adversarial testing is essential to ensuring a constitutionally fair trial, and pitting
the government against the defendant is also thought to strengthen the reliability
of the outcome at trial.66 Perhaps the best examples of the Court relying on this
adversarial-testing value are in the landmark right-to-counsel cases of Gideon v.
Wainwright67 and Strickland v. Washington.68 In these cases, the Court referred
to the fundamental fairness goal of providing a defendant with effective
assistance of counsel. In Gideon, the Court found that the constitutional
requirement of fairness entitles indigent defendants to have counsel appointed for
them.69 The Court explained: It is "an obvious truth" that, "in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege
against self-incrimination").
63. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-25 (laying out the
Court's Due Process analysis).
64. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-25 (laying out
the Court's Due Process analysis).
65. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 524-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 535 (White, J., dissenting)
("If the rule announced today were truly based on a conclusion that all confessions resulting from
custodial interrogation are coerced, then it would simply have no rational foundation.").
66. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (referring to "our fundamental
values and most noble aspirations," which include "our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-
individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load" (internal quotations omitted)). There is, however, some debate about
whether the adversarial system is better at finding truth than an inquisitorial system. See WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 44 (5th ed. 2009).
67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
68. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
69. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
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lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."7 0 In
Strickland, the Court stated that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel means a "right to the effective assistance of counsel."7 1 The Court
explained that the Due Process Clause guarantees the right to a fair trial and that
the Assistance of Counsel Clause specifies some of the rights essential to such a
fair trial. 72 This fairness guarantee includes subjecting evidence "to adversarial
testing[,] . . . [and] [t]he right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial
system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and
knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the
case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled."73 Accordingly, if a criminal
defendant's attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel, and there is a
reasonable probability that the result would have otherwise been different-that
confidence in the verdict has been undermined-the defendant is entitled to a
new trial. 74
The Court similarly highlighted the importance of adversarial testing in
Crane v. Kentucky,75 in which a unanimous Court examined whether the
defendant's evidence about the "physical and psychological environment in
which [his] confession was obtained" was admissible at trial. 76 The Court stated
that, "[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the
Sixth Amendment, . . . the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."77 Continuing on, the
Court explained that excluding the type of evidence at issue would "deprive[] a
defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter and survive
the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."78 To preserve this value of
adversarial testing, the Court ruled that the evidence should have been admitted
at trial.79
When assessing an issue under the constellation of criminal constitutional
rights at play in Miranda, the Court has also focused on the value of truth-
finding, indicating that proper outcomes in the criminal justice system-the
conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent-is important. For
70. Id. at 344.
71. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)).
72. See id. at 684-85 (emphasis added) ("The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the
Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several
provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause .....
73. Id. at 685.
74. See id at 691-96.
75. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
76. Id at 684.
77. Id. at 690.
78. Id. at 690-91.
79. See id. at 692.
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example, in Brady v. Maryland,8 0 the Court suggested that requiring the
prosecution to turn over material exculpatory information to the defendant serves
the truth-finding goal of the Due Process Clause. Through the lens of fairness,
the Court explained that "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted
but when criminal trials are fair,"81 and it is the prosecutor's job to achieve
justice, not necessarily win the case.8 2 The right outcome of trial-truth of guilt
and innocence-is the goal rather than just convicting the defendant regardless of
the evidence. 3 This value of truth-finding seemed to outweigh the adversarial-
testing aspect of fairness here.
The Court was more explicit about the truth-finding goal of due process in its
1970 case of Williams v. Florida.8 4 There, the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that he should not have to comply with a state rule requiring him to
provide pretrial notice of his alibi defense because it would deprive him of
constitutional due process or a fair trial.8 5 Responding to the allegation that the
state rule was at odds with the game-like nature of the adversary system, the
Court stated that "[t]he adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself, it is not
yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their
cards until played."8 6 Instead, the Court explained, the rule was "designed to
enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial," and, "[g]iven the ease with
which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an
eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate."8 7 Although the Court
found truth-finding to trump adversarial testing, this is not always the case,8 8 and
other values remain similarly important.
80. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
81. Id. at 87.
82. See id. at 87-88 & n.2.
83. LaFave et al. have distinguished truth-finding from "[m]inimizing [e]rroneous
[c]onvictions." See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 66, at 42-43, 46. They explained that, "[i]n its
emphasis on reliable factfinding, the truthfinding goal seeks to ensure equally the accuracy of both
guilty verdicts and acquittals." Id. at 46. In contrast, the value of "minimizing erroneous
convictions" places a premium on "the accuracy of the guilty verdict," "reflect[ing] a desire to
minimize the chance of convicting an innocent person even at the price of increasing the chance
that a guilty person may escape conviction." Id
84. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
85. See id. at 81. The state rule "require[d] a defendant, on written demand of the prosecuting
attorney, to give notice in advance of trial if the defendant intend[ed] to claim an alibi, and to
furnish the prosecuting attorney with information as to the place where he claim[ed] to have been
and with the names and addresses of the alibi witnesses he intend[ed] to use." Id. at 79.
86. Id. at 82.
87. Id. at 81.
88. For example, although they would arguably serve the value of truth-finding, open-file
discovery rules are not constitutionally mandated, and prudential limits on litigating claims alleging
proof of actual innocence are routinely upheld. See Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31
CARDozo L. REV. 2119, 2126 (2010) ("Open-file discovery clearly goes beyond what is required by
either the constitution or ethical rules."); Don J. Degabrielle & Eliot F. Turner, Ethics, Justice, and
Prosecution, 32 REV. LIfG. 279, 293 (2013) (asserting that "the Court has made clear that open-file
discovery is not constitutionally required under Brady"); Ryan & Adams, supra note 17, at 1106-
09 (noting limitations on collateral attacks).
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The Court has also relied on the value of dignity in deciding important
constitutional criminal procedure questions. In addition to the Court's reference
to dignity in Miranda, the Court has discussed this value in several other cases.
For example, the Court has said that the Sixth Amendment "right to appear pro
se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused and to allow the
presentation of what may, at least occasionally, be the accused's best possible
defense."8 9 Expounding on this idea in Indiana v. Edwards,90 the Court referred
to a defendant's dignity in approving a higher competency standard for a
defendant to represent himself.9 ' It explained that a state may require a higher
competency standard to represent oneself than simply the competency to stand
trial because "a right of self-representation at trial will not 'affirm the dignity' of
a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the
assistance of counsel." 9 2 The Court was concerned that a defendant's self-
representation could result in a humiliating spectacle rather than positively serve
the defendant.93 Further, it could result in an unfair trial. 94 Although the Court's
conception of dignity may vary somewhat from case to case, it remains a
significant factor in the determination of cases under this constellation of
constitutional provisions.
Finally, the Court has looked at the value of equality. Equal treatment among
various defendants is a value less frequently cited by the Court under these
constitutional provisions, but the Court does occasionally invoke this
consideration as well. The Gideon case, for example, emphasized the importance
of "every defendant stand[ing] equal before the law." 95 This essential component
of fairness, the Court explained, "cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him" while a rich man is
competently assisted by counsel. 96 Being treated equally under the law is
essential and has a foothold alongside the values of adversarial testing, truth-
finding, and dignity in the Court's analysis under the constellation of rights
embodied in the Self-Incrimination, Assistance-of-Counsel, and Due Process
Clauses of the Constitution.
89. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984).
90. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
91. See id. at 176-77.
92. Id at 176.
93. See id. (concluding that, "given the defendant's uncertain mental state," self-representation
at trial could result in a "spectacle" that is "at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling").
The Edwards Court's conception of dignity is arguably at odds with the autonomy-based
conception of dignity, which could have supported allowing the defendant to represent himself
without meeting this higher state threshold of competence.
94. See id. at 176-77.
95. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
96. Id.
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IV. ADVERSARIAL TESTING AND DIGNITY IN MIRANDA
The Miranda Court heavily relied on two of the four values generally
invoked in criminal procedure cases relying on a constellation of constitutional
provisions like the Self-Incrimination, Assistance-of-Counsel, and Due Process
Clauses. More specifically, the Court focused on the two interrelated concepts of
adversarial testing and human dignity. The Self-Incrimination Clause on which
Miranda explicitly relied provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."9 7 The Miranda Court
explained that "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government-state or federal--must accord to the dignity and integrity
of its citizens."98 This entails two distinct values. First, the Court stated that the
privilege requiring the government, "by its own independent labors," to produce
evidence against the defendant exists "[t]o maintain a 'fair-state-individual
balance,' to require the government 'to shoulder the entire load."'9 9 This
highlights the value of adversarial testing.1 00 Second, the Court explained that the
privilege requires the state "to respect the inviolability of the human
personality"' 0 ' and noted that the interrogation techniques then employed by the
police were "destructive of human dignity."102 This latter focus on dignity, as
well as the Court's emphasis on adversarial testing, was central to the Court's
analysis.
Miranda did not really focus on the values of equality or truth-finding,
though. Perhaps it should not be surprising that the Court neglected to discuss
equality. The Court's appeal to this worthy goal seems to be much less frequent
in the Court's analysis of this constellation of rights. Despite the Court's
inattention to equality, the Miranda decision probably does further this important
value by ensuring, at least in theory, that even the uninformed learn about their
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel and their right not to incriminate
themselves. 0 3 This puts these at-risk defendants on a more equal playing field.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
98. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
99. Id.
100. Professor Wayne LaFave et al. have disaggregated "adversarial" and "accusatorial"
objectives. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 66, at 43-46. According to them, "[t]he adversarial
element assigns to the participants the responsibility for developing the legal and factual issues of
the case, while the accusatorial element allocates burdens as between the parties with respect to the
adjudication of guilt." Id. at 46. However, as LaFave et al. noted, some courts consider these
accusatorial aspects to be part of adversarial testing. See id. at 43. Following this latter approach,
this article treats the two as an aggregated whole-as the value of adversarial testing.
101. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
102. Id. at 457.
103. This is certainly debatable, as many defendants do not understand their Miranda rights
even once they are given a Miranda warning. See 1. Bruce Frumkin & Alfredo Garcia,
Psychological Evaluations and the Competency to Waive Miranda Rights, CHAMPION, Nov. 2003,
at 12 ("Individuals under the age of 15, and older suspects with lower than average intelligence, are
generally not able to fully understand and waive their Miranda rights.").
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It is more striking that Miranda did not focus on truth-finding. As Justice
Harlan suggested in his dissent, there is a real risk that the rule the majority set
forth in the case could cut against this important value. 104 Justice Harlan
explained that, while defense counsel's role at trial is crucial because an
understanding of technical points of law and evidence are essential at trial, in the
station house a defense lawyer "may become an obstacle to truth-finding." 0 5
According to Justice Harlan, there could "be little doubt that the Court's new
code would markedly decrease the number of confessions."10 6 Without these
confessions, the criminal justice system would be hamstrung in finding the truth
of what happened in a case. 107 Moreover, the remedy the Court applied in
Miranda-the exclusion of un-mirandized confessions-keeps evidence from the
jury that could very well be reliable-at least in some cases.10s
In contrast to the Miranda majority's neglect of the truth-finding goal, today,
probably the most well-publicized concern with respect to confessions is their
truthfulness-4heir reliability. In recent years, it has come to light that many
criminal defendants falsely confess. 0 9 According to the National Registry of
Exonerations, which reports known exonerations beginning in 1989, of the 1,940
exonerations that have been recorded, 234-or about 12 0/o--involved a false
confession.1 10 These statistics and further research as to why individuals confess
have led to resonant calls for courts to guard against blind reliance on these tools
of wrongful conviction by, for example, conducting pretrial hearings on the
reliability of confessions'1 ' and admitting expert testimony about the possibility
of wrongful confessions.1 12
104. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514-16 (Harlan, J., dissenting). There is a rich literature debating
whether the Miranda decision actually furthers or hinders truth-finding. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
105. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 514 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 516.
107. See id. at 514-16.
108. See Jeffrey Standen, The Politics of Miranda, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 566
(2003) ("Miranda occasionally excludes from evidence confessions that are reliable, relevant, and
voluntary because the Miranda warnings, presumably already known by the suspect by heart, were
not provided in full or in a timely fashion."). It is important to note that Miranda might actually
further truth-finding, as it excludes unreliable confessions. See Ryan & Adams, supra note 17, at
1091-93 (discussing the possibility of false confessions).
109. See The National Registry of Exonerations, supra note 17.
110. See id.
I 11. See Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An
Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV.
59, 764-65, 801-08 (2013) ("Upon a motion by the defense, courts in criminal cases should
evaluate the reliability of confession evidence, which could be undertaken at the same pretrial
hearing in which they assess voluntariness.").
112. See, e.g., Danielle E. Chojnacki et al., An Empirical Basis for the Admission of Expert
Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 2-4, 39-45 (2008) (arguing that expert
testimony on the reliability of confessions should be admitted into evidence); see also Brandon L.
Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REv. 395, 415-33 (2015) (suggesting that
scientific research inform a multi-pronged effort to improve the reliability of confessions used to
convict defendants).
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This focus on truth has permeated criminal law and procedure, morphing into
something of an obsession. From the discovery that the FBI has given erroneous
testimony on hair analysis in over 95% of their re-examined cases in which that
evidence was involved,113 to the breakout true-crime documentaries Serial 14 and
Making a Murderer,s15 which told the dramatic stories of possible real-life
wrongful convictions and were followed by millions, the media has pummeled us
with numerous stories of innocent people likely being wrongfully convicted.
Beyond this general theme of truth-finding, a whole host of particular criminal
law and procedure issues have begun to revolve around this seductive value.
Recent research on the reliability of eyewitness testimony, confidential informant
testimony, arson evidence, shaken baby syndrome diagnoses, and even
fingerprint evidence has led to cries for reform in an overwhelming number of
criminal law and procedure areas. And some courts and legislatures are slowly
heeding these calls by, for example, requiring new procedures for eyewitness
identifications, 116 corroboration for snitch testimony,1 17 and re-examination of
evidence used at trial. 118
Why this focus on truth? During the course of the last few decades, we have
been faced with evidence of a shocking number of wrongful convictions. The
National Registry of Exonerations places the current number of wrongful
convictions at 1,940.119 A substantial portion of these exonerations (436, or 22%)
113. See Ryan & Adams, supra note 17, at 1084 (noting "the recent revelation that FBI forensic
experts gave flawed testimony in over 95% of re-examined cases in which the experts provided hair
analysis testimony"); Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 18, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-
matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11 e4-b5 10-
962fcfabc310 story.html.
114. See Jonah Bromwich, After 'Serial,' What Podcasts to Listen To, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01 /business/media/after-serial-what-podcasts-to-listen-to.html
(explaining that Serial, which "told the story of a crime committed in Baltimore in 1999[,] ...
quickly became the most popular podcast in the history of the form[, having] been downloaded
more than 90 million times").
115. See Mekado Murphy, Behind 'Making a Murderer, 'a New Documentary Series on Nelflix,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/arts/television/behind-making-a-
murderer-a-new-documentary-series-on-netflix.html? r") (reporting the background of Making a
Murderer, a serialized true-crime documentary that tells the story of Steven Avery, who served
eighteen years in prison for sexual assault, was exonerated for that offense, and then was later
arrested, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison for the crime of murder).
116. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(b) (2013) (setting forth new procedures to
improve the reliability of eyewitness identifications).
117. See, e.g., TEx. CRIm. PROC. CODE ANN. § art. 38.075(a) (2009) ("A defendant may not be
convicted of an offense on the testimony of a person to whom the defendant made a statement
against the defendant's interest during a time when the person was imprisoned or confined in the
same correctional facility as the defendant unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence
tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.").
118. See, e.g., generally Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
(superseded by statute on other grounds) (granting the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus based on
his claim of actual innocence that was grounded in new evidence-the recantation of victim
testimony).
119. See The National Registry ofExonerations, supra note 17.
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was identified through the use of DNA evidence.1 20 Indeed, DNA evidence has
been heavily relied upon in criminal cases since it was first introduced in
criminal courts in 1986.121 DNA evidence is thought to be incredibly reliable,
due in part to its development from the research culture of universities 22 and in
part to the low probabilities that two samples of DNA would match if not sourced
from the same individual.123 In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences issued a
report entitled Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward, which explained that DNA evidence is the "gold standard" of forensic
evidence; unlike bite-mark evidence, tool-mark evidence, and hair analysis (to
name a few), DNA evidence has the potential to get us to the truth of what
happened in a case.124
Although our focus on truth may have been triggered by the overwhelming
numbers of exonerations, it is really tools like DNA analysis that have catalyzed
this focus on truth. Recent advances in science and technology have imbued us
with considerable confidence in assessing the truth-whether that be the
discovery that Einstein's theory of relativity is correct,1 25 that Higgs-boson
particles really do exist (well, at least probably),1 26 or that Mr. Smith murdered
Mr. Jones.1 27 We are, at least in some jurisdictions, making progress toward truth
by, for example, improving eyewitness testimony through more careful line-
120. See id.
121. See Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for Crime Solving: A Judicial and
Legislative History, FORENSIC MAGAZINE, Jan. 6, 2005. DNA evidence was first used in American
courts in 1987. See id.; Randy James, A Brief History ofDNA Testing, TIME, June 19, 2009.
122. See NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 130 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/228091.pdf. This is in
contrast to the other forensic science disciplines that were generally birthed in police stations and
forensic science laboratories. These arenas do not have the same type of research cultures that can
be found in research universities. See id.
123. See id.
124. Ryan & Adams, supra note 17, at 1080; see NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCI., supra note 122, at
130 ("DNA typing is now universally recognized as the standard against which many other forensic
individualization techniques are judged. DNA enjoys this preeminent position because of its
reliability and the fact that, absent fraud or an error in labeling or handling, the probabilities of false
positive are quantifiable and often miniscule."). Of course DNA evidence is subject to error as well.
See infra text accompanying notes 133-135.
125. See Dennis Overbye, Gravitational Waves Detected Confirming Einstein's Theory, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2016 ("A team of scientists announced on Thursday that they had heard and
recorded the sound of two black holes colliding a billion light-years away, a fleeting chirp that
fulfilled the last prediction of Einstein's general theory of relativity."). Still, DNA can often get us
to the truth of a case.
126. See The ATLAS Collaboration, A Particle Consistent with the Higgs Boson Observed with
the ATLAS Detector at the Large Hadron Collider, 338 SCI. 1576, 1581-82 (2012).
127. Cf Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 121, 141
(2014) ("Along with our confidence in the power of DNA evidence that has revealed the
wrongfulness of hundreds of convictions, we seem to be confident that we are not as blinded by
fear and vengeance as our predecessors and can instead make better determinations of
proportionate and just punishment.").
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ups,12 8 improving our knowledge on the reliability of forensic sciences like arson
science and bite mark evidence,1 29 and opening up case files to criminal
defendants.130 Even the long-standing practice of sentencing is being overhauled
by inserting data into sentencing determinations-a system referred to as
evidence-based sentencing.131 As our scientific and technological tools like DNA
analysis have improved, our confidence in finding the truth has swelled.
But Miranda is not about truth-finding. It is instead about adversarial testing
and human dignity. Our recent focus on truth-finding risks overshadowing these
other important criminal justice values.1 32 But why do we care about these goals
aside from truth-finding? Isn't truth the most important goal of our criminal
justice system?
Despite our advances in science and technology, truth may be difficult to
come by. And certainty of truth is generally impossible. We recognize the
impossibility of the certainty of truth by our burden of proof in criminal cases-
128. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-20-2 (2016) (setting forth new guidelines for "[1]ive lineups,
photo lineups, or showups" to improve the reliability of eyewitness identification).
129. See Ex Parte Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (stating that "concern
over 'bad' arson science" contributed to the Texas legislature "creat[ing] the Texas Forensics
Commission in 2005 to strengthen the use of 'good' science in criminal proceedings and to
investigate 'allegations of negligence or misconduct' in forensic sciences"); TEx. FORENSIC SCi.
COMM'N, FORENSIC BiTEMARK COMPARISON COMPLAINT FILED BY NATIONAL INNOCENCE PROJECT
ON BEHALF OF STEVEN MARK CHANEY-Final Report (2016),
http://www.fsc.texas.gov/sites/default/files/FinalBiteMarkReport.pdf (recommending "that
bitemark comparison not be admitted in criminal cases in Texas unless and until" more research is
conducted to establish the reliability of the practice); TEx. FORENSIC SCI. CoMm'N, REPORT OF THE
TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION: WLLINGHAM/WILLIS INVESTIGATION (2011), http://
www.fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINAL.pdf (urging that arson investigations be improved in Texas).
130. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a) (2013) ("Upon motion of the defendant, the court
must order . . . [t]he State to make available to the defendant the complete files of all law
enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and prosecutors' offices involved in the investigation
of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant."). See generally Ryan & Adams,
supra note 17, at 1110-19 (laying out a number of "steps in the right direction" toward cutting back
on questionable tools used to convict potentially innocent defendants).
131. See Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: Are We Up to the Task?, 23 FED.
SENT'G REP. 153, 153 (2010) ("The concept of EBS dates back to adoption by the Conference of
Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators in August 2007 of a formal
resolution in support of 'state efforts to adopt sentencing and corrections policies and programs
based on the best research evidence of practices shown to be effective in reducing recidivism."').
132. Cf Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's Growing
Anxiety About Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 315, 324-25 (2010) ("Factual,
DNA-proven innocence poses a threat to the fundamental legal principles underlying our system of
justice, in particular to the presumption of innocence."); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The
Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital
Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 615-16 (2005) ("[W]e are
worried that the current focus on innocence may implicitly concede the lesser power of other
systemic critiques."). But see generally Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 1549
(2008) (summarizing criticisms of the innocence movement but concluding that "innocentrism,
while far from a panacea to the criminal justice system's many ills, is a positive bipartisan
occurrence and one that ultimately can complement, rather than replace, the emphasis on
substantive and procedural rights that for good reason rest at the core of American criminal law").
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt.1 33 We do not require certainty of guilt-not
because certainty of guilt is undesirable but because certainty of guilt is
exceedingly difficult to come by. Even DNA analysis, in which we place so
much faith, is not infallible. Not only is there some small probability that an
unknown blood sample found at the crime scene will have the same DNA profile
as a known blood sample in the database even though the samples are not from
the same source, but there are also numerous errors that can occur in taking and
analyzing those samples that could taint the results. For example, there can be
cross-contamination in the laboratory, the forensic scientist may err in running
the samples or interpreting the results, or the forensic scientist may lie about the
results.1 34 Furthermore, just because an individual's DNA is found at a crime
scene does not mean that the individual committed the crime at issue.135
Just as in the past, we cannot necessarily know the truth. The adversarial
system is one way that we have attempted to uncover the truth, though. The
thought is that pitting the prosecution against the defense will cause the truth to
come out because each side will voraciously tear away at the other's case.
Indeed, circumstances often guarantee that the parties will be starkly opposed.
The defendant, with a lot at stake, has a strong incentive to uncover exculpatory
evidence-of course with the assistance of counsel.1 36 The defendant might also
have the greatest knowledge about the facts of the case. The prosecutor, on the
other hand, has incentive to develop facts that inculpate the defendant. His or her
career success could very well be affected by the case's outcome."' But the
prosecutor is also charged with seeking justice; he or she is not to pursue a
conviction not supported by at least probable cause."' Still, these circumstances
generally set the stage for a rigorous contest.
133. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
134. See NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCI., supra note 122, at 130; Ryan & Adams, supra note 17, at
1083.
135. See Ryan & Adams, supra note 17, at 1083; Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful
Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 274 n.89 (2012) ("While DNA evidence can be 'uniquely
probative' of a defendant's innocence, it is not conclusive. For example, the defendant may not
have left behind any of his DNA, and the trace DNA evidence examined could belong to his partner
or an innocent individual." (internal citations omitted)).
136. Of course the effectiveness of this defendant-defense counsel team could in reality be
hampered by limited resources for defense counsel and the defendant's possible pretrial
confinement.
137. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims ofInnocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 134-35 (2004).
138. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.200.B (1997) ("[F]ailure to
meet the minimal requirement of probable cause is an absolute bar to initiating a Federal
prosecution . . . ."); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION §3-3.9(a) (AM.
BAR ASS'N 1992).
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To the extent that the truth cannot be determined by pitting the prosecution
against the defense, the result of this adversarial-testing approach favors the
defendant.139 In these circumstances, it is appropriate to adopt prophylactic rules
that protect innocent persons as well as those who are guilty. This sentiment is
reflected in our criminal justice system's strict proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard that must be met by the prosecution. 140 Indeed, as William Blackstone
stated, it is "better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer." 141 Of course the effectiveness of this prophylactic measure is limited by
the resources available to the defendant. The sorry state of funding for public
defense in this country certainly undermines the effectiveness of this strategy.142
The effectiveness of the prophylaxis may also be limited by outside influences
like the reverse CSI-effect-where the jury might be more likely to convict
because of the heightened value it places on forensic evidence-which could
give the prosecution an edge.1 43 Despite these limitations, the strategy of
adversarial testing recognizes the significant limitation of focusing solely on the
truth: certainty of truth is ordinarily unobtainable. This is so even though many of
our scientific and technological tools aimed at truth are more powerful than ever
before and even though many of our substantive and procedural rules are more
accommodating of truth-finding than in the past.
In addition to highlighting the value of adversarial testing, Miranda touted
the value of human dignity. But what is this protection of dignity all about?
Although the concept of dignity has been criticized for being vague or
meaningless,144 the Court has referred to dignity across different constitutional
139. Note that LaFave et al. have considered this to be an aspect of "accusatorial burdens"
rather than "adversary adjudication." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 66, at 43-46; supra note 100. It is
also worth noting that this idea that the adversarial-testing approach favors the defendant is
dependent on the defendant having adequate counsel and sufficient investigatory resources-an
assumption that very will may not hold in the milieu of today's criminal justice system. See infra
text accompanying note 142.
140. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); supra text accompanying note 133.
According to LaFave et al., this is considered to be an aspect of "accusatorial burdens" rather than
"adversary adjudication." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 66, at 43-46; supra notes 100 & 139.
141. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; see also Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 208 (1997).
142. See generally NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, Rationing Justice: The
Underfunding of Assigned Counsel Systems, in GIDEON AT 50: A THREE-PART EXAMINATION OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE IN AMERICA (2013), file:///C:/Users/34006470/Downloads/
Gideon%20at/o2050%20-%2Part%/o201 %20Rationing%2OJustice.pdf (examining state funding for
public defense counsel).
143. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSJ and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice
in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1084 (2006) (defining "a reverse CSI effect" as "raising
the perceived probative value of the evidence and increasing the likelihood of conviction").
144. See Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth
Amendment, 2016 ILL. L. REv. 2129, 2139 (2016); see also Helga Kuhse, Is There a Tension
Between Autonomy and Dignity?, in 2 BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW 61, 72 (Peter Kemp et al. eds. 2000)
(asserting that dignity is "nothing more than a short-hand expression for people's moral intuitions
and feelings"); Ruth Macklin, Dignity is a Useless Concept, 327 BRITISH MED. J. 1419, 1419 (2003)
("[Aippeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other, more precise, notions or mere slogans
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clauses. For example, the Court has repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is premised on preserving the
dignity of man. 145 While it is not entirely clear what the Court is referring to
here, it seems that the Court is suggesting that it is important to take into account
the individual offender in determining punishment, not take a merely utilitarian
approach to punishment.1 46 The Court's conception of dignity seems to vary
across constitutional disciplines and among individual cases. In Miranda, the
Court refers to dignity in the context of examining the coercive techniques
employed by police officers in attempting to obtain confessions.1 47 The Miranda
Court seemed concerned about more than the physical inviolability and
autonomy of the suspect, though, as previously existing due process protections
already prohibited obtaining confessions through physical force and other
coercive methods like sleep deprivation.1 48 Invoking the Self-Incrimination
Clause, the Court also seemed troubled by police officers' reliance on
psychological techniques in obtaining confessions.' 4 9 The Court thus seemed
committed to protecting the dignity of one's mind rather than just physical
inviolability and autonomy. Indeed, one's mind holds a special place in criminal
law. Just as the home has a special status in the law-often individuals engaging
in self-defense are not required to retreat from the home,'so and there is generally
greater Fourth Amendment protection in the homels'-an individual's mind also
that add nothing to an understanding of the topic."); Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2008, https://newrepublic.com/article/64674/the-stupidity-dignity (stating
that "the concept of dignity remains a mess"-"a phenomenon of human perception").
145. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) ("The basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311
(2002) (same); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (same).
146. See Ryan, supra note 144.
147. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966) (discussing the "widespread" use of
"physical brutality" and psychological manipulation employed in police interrogation and stating
that "[a]n understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to [the
Miranda] decision(]").
148. See supra text accompanying notes 18-23. As the Miranda Court noted, however, the
effectiveness of these due process protections was somewhat questionable at the time the case was
decided. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-47. Although due process jurisprudence at the time
prohibited the use of force to elicit confessions, "[tihe use of physical brutality and violence [was]
not, unfortunately relegated to the past or to any part of the country." Id at 446. A then-recent
example of this was from "Kings County, New York, [where] the police brutally beat, kicked and
placed lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under interrogation for the purpose
of securing a statement incriminating a third party." Id. Further, the remedy for a due process
violation is the same as a remedy for a Miranda violation-exclusion of the evidence. See Scott A.
McCreight, Colorado v. Connelly: Due Process Challenges to Confessions and Evidentiary
Reliability Interests, 73 IOWA L. REv. 207, 222 (1987) ("Exclusion of the evidence is the only
available remedy to enforce the due process right."); supra note 26.
149. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-58.
150. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense,
86 MARQ. L. REv. 653, 665-66 (2003) ("[C]ourts agree that there is no duty to retreat when
claiming the defense of one's habitation.").
151. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
2.3(b) (5th ed.) ("The home 'is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections,' for it is
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holds a special status. For example, one ordinarily cannot be convicted for just
having evil thoughts; actus reus is generally required for conviction. 152 Similarly,
as the Fifth Amendment states, one cannot be forced to testify against oneself.153
Respecting the dignity of the offender's mind could even have real implications
for the police practices of today that employ deception and trickery. Perhaps
engaging in such practices results in invading the interstices of the suspect's
mind and in this way violates his dignity. Regardless of the full meaning of this
concept of dignity, there are values beyond just truth-finding that should not be
forgotten. Just like we sacrifice truth for the sake of privacy when a judge
excludes probative evidence that was found in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, 154 values such as dignity remain important even aside from their
relationship to truth.
V. CONCLUSION
In a criminal justice world that increasingly focuses on science and
technology in the hope of ascertaining truth, there is a risk that other important
criminal justice values will be pushed aside. The Miranda case, which was
decided during a time less focused on truth-finding, laid out the still relevant
values of adversarial testing and human dignity. In recent years, though, the
Court has chipped away at the power of Miranda, and the criminal justice system
has often set aside these essential values as it has honed in on the importance of
truth-finding. But adversarial testing and dignity-whatever exactly it means-
continue to be important. Despite our confidence in new science and technology,
truth-and especially certainty of truth-remains elusive. Adversarial testing
aims at seeking the truth while simultaneously acknowledging the difficulties
associated with this. It also serves as a prophylactic to lessen the chance that an
innocent person may suffer.ss This approach is far from perfect, and it has the
cost of possibly freeing some guilty offenders, but, as a society, we have found
this to be an important value of the criminal justice system. Respecting dignity is
at the core of our criminal justice system and the individual rights enumerated in
our Constitution. We care not only about punishing the guilty and freeing the
quite clearly a place as to which there exists a justified expectation of privacy against unreasonable
intrusion." (quoting Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966))).
152. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIIvNAL LAW 320-21 (5th ed. 2010) ("Bad thoughts alone cannot
constitute a crime; there must be an act, or an omission to act where there is a legal duty to act.").
153. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . ").
154. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) ("The exclusionary rule generates
'substantial social costs,' which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at
large." (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))); Pa. Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524
U.S. 357, 364 (1998) (stating that the exclusionary rule "undeniably detracts from the truthfinding
process and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the consequences of their
actions").
155. But cf supra notes 100, 139-140 and accompanying text (noting that this is sometimes
labeled as a component of "accusatorial burdens" rather than adversarial testing).
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innocent, but we also care about respecting each individual, regardless of that
person's guilt. This is for the sake of the individual but also for the sake of
society as a whole. It is essential that these important values not be sacrificed for
the sake of today's alluring truth-finding goal.
